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1SOME REMARKS ON THE
ANGLO-FRENCH DEFENCE TREATY
There is a well-known (though probably apocryphal) story told of Lord Raglan, the 
Commander of the British Expeditionary Force to the Crimea, concerning an incident a few 
days before the Charge of the Light Brigade in 1854. Emerging from his tent in the early 
morning, he was plunged into panic that his encampment had been overrun by the enemy, 
because he saw a large number of French soldiers. It was only with difficulty that the senile 
veteran of Waterloo could be restored from his subsequent swoon with the reminder that 
these men were now our allies. Similar incomprehension and semi-consciousness seemed 
to overcome a large section of the British media at the news of the signing, in November 
of last year, of the Anglo-French Defence Treaty. ‘The Sun’, for instance, usually almost 
clinically obsessed with France and the military, confined itself to a restrained report just 
before the show-business section. And it has remained one of the least reported, and 
analysed, of this Government’s policies, whilst being, without question, one of its 
most significant.
Since 1815, no other major country has been more consistently our ally than France. It is a 
curiosity of history that when the Entente Cordiale was being negotiated in the spring of 
1904, the only extant British war plans against a great power were in the Admiralty, for a 
naval conflict with the United States. Naturally, Washington has loomed very large in the 
emergence of the Treaty. Its origins can be most directly traced back to President Sarkozy’s 
visit to President Bush in the summer of 2008, that led to France re-joining the military 
structures of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in March 2009 (thereby ending a policy 
of detachment which had lasted since 1966). This is not to dismiss entirely the legacy of 
the 1998 St Malo accord. Prime Minister Blair did present that, to President Clinton, as 
encouraging a French rapprochement with NATO. But there is no indication this was in 
President Chirac’s mind. And the total exclusion of the strategic dimension then is very 
striking. Moreover, it would be a mistake to underestimate the caesura caused by the Iraq 
War, which extended to all aspects of Britain’s European diplomacy. President Sarkozy was 
at pains to make ‘a fresh start’ with the Americans; both he and Prime Minister Cameron 
used the same phrase at the lunch following the signature of the Treaty. 
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2The United States has long pursued a general policy of encouraging greater European 
defence cooperation – and indeed integration – within NATO. The most dramatic example 
of this was the proposal in 1954, formulated by Ambassador Stassen and Minister Pleven, 
to create a European Army (the European Defence Community) as a means of avoiding 
West German national rearmament in response to the aggravated Soviet threat following 
the suppression of the East German uprisings the previous year. This included Britain 
(despite Churchill describing it as a ‘sludgy amalgam’). Its failure, as a result of its narrow 
rejection by the Assemblée Nationale (it would have passed at Westminster), directly 
precipitated the convening of the Messina Conference, 15 months later, which led to the 
Treaty of Rome. Such (often contrary) interplay between defence cooperation and wider 
European integration remains a critical theme. It is also a feature of the Treaty. One reason 
for British engagement is certainly the growing sense that defence, above all strategic 
defence, affords a ‘developing opportunity’ to exert real influence on European affairs, ‘to 
counter-balance the possible loss of influence through not participating in the Euro’.1  
President Bush was not known for perceiving America’s weakness. He undoubtedly regarded 
the French return to the core of NATO as an American victory and the accompanying 
understanding with President Sarkozy that the United States would use its influence to 
persuade Britain towards more bilateral defence cooperation with France as essentially 
merely a revival of the St Malo agenda, in the light of the then still underestimated 
pressures for financial retrenchment. His successor has made a very different, and altogether 
more sober, assessment. Over recent months, both Robert Gates and Leon Panetta have 
been famously outspoken about the United States’ changing geopolitical priorities, in 
particular ‘away from Europe towards the Pacific’, and its determination to see ‘Europeans 
do more for their defence at every level’. Symbolic of this new strategy has been the 
supporting role upon which the United States has insisted in the conflict in Libya. The 
problem is obvious: precisely those pressures which are encouraging the United States to 
wish European NATO members to assume a greater share of the burden of their defence, 
are also causing them to be increasingly reluctant to make the expenditure necessary to 
do so. Far from raising, or even maintaining, their present military budgets, Europeans are 
everywhere decreasing them, sometimes quite dramatically. The European members of 
NATO together spend barely 40% of the United States defence budget and can deploy for 
expeditionary warfare only some 15% of the number of soldiers available to the Americans. 
Nevertheless, the 27 countries of the European Union have half a million more soldiers than 
the United States.
In October last year, then Secretary Fox announced defence cuts of nearly 8% out of a total 
of some £33 billion, or 2.7% of GDP, the second highest share of national income (after 
Greece at 2.9%!) in the European Union. These were the most stringent since the end of 
the Cold War. For several commentators, their actual scale was matched only by their 
apparent incoherence, symbolised by the decision to have two new carriers, 
1  Remarks made by Quentin Davies, former Labour Defence Minister, and formerly a pro-European Conservative, who is responsible  
           for taking forward the negotiations on the Treaty prior to the 2010 General Election. 
SU_AngloFrench.indd   2 23/01/2012   12:32:26
3but without any fixed-wing aircraft to fly from them, for up to eight years. But easily the 
most significant economy was the allocation of the costs (currently estimated at around 
£25 billion for four boats, but excluding the price of the warheads) of the Trident nuclear 
deterrent renewal programme to the normal defence budget, rather than, as had hitherto 
always been the case, to a special central fund. Several experts, most notably Professor 
Chalmers,2 have pointed out that the medium term (post 2016, when the decision to go 
ahead with the programme is now scheduled, known as ‘High Gate’) negative impact 
of this upon all other categories of military expenditure would be very considerable (a 
further reduction of the equipment budget of at least 10%), if no new money were to be 
forthcoming. For example, it might mean that one of the new carriers would have to be 
decommissioned without ever having deployed British fixed-wing aircraft: ‘an incoherence 
that becomes an absurdity’.
France too, is in the process of undertaking cuts in defence spending. Almost simultaneously 
with his British counterpart, Minister Morin set out a reduction of 3% out of a total of some 
€44 billion, or 2% of GDP (the NATO ‘guideline’ level as a share of national wealth, the 
third highest in the European Union). These were across a range of capabilities but especially 
impacted the air force. This relatively modest exercise, which included some €2 billion to be 
recovered by disposals of property and other assets, seems likely to become more serious 
over the next few years. Some experts, like Doctor Tertrais,3 have expressed the view that, 
even without a change of government following next year’s elections, these could be at 
least a further 4-5% reduction. Larger numbers have been canvassed especially in Socialist 
circles, if the expenditure on the renewal of France’s nuclear deterrent, which is covered 
by a separate budget, as was previously the case in Britain, is consolidated to any degree. 
The modernisation of the critical sea-launched portion of the Force de Frappe has been 
almost completed. The last of four submarines, ‘Le Terrible’, equipped with the latest M51 
ballistic missile, entered service at the end of last year, whilst the remaining three boats will 
exchange their existing M45 missiles with the new system over the next 7 years. The costs 
of this have been broadly comparable to those now facing the British.
Obviously, one important objective of the Anglo-French Treaty has been to mitigate these 
stresses. Thus the new British aircraft-carriers are being modified to take French fixed-wing 
aircraft (as well as American machines). Similar modifications will be made to future French 
carriers to take British fixed-wing aircraft, as they become available. Again, the agreement 
to create a joint expeditionary force, will involve sharing training and other facilities and 
equipment, particularly with regard to the future A400M transport aircraft. But such 
initiatives all still, understandably, conform to the ‘pooled but separable’ model. They fall 
more into the category of making existing expenditure go further, rather than of allowing 
for substantial savings. These might arise over time, particularly if a real effort is made 
to consolidate the British and French defence industries: a process evidently fraught with 
difficulty, though the entry into force, in August, of the EU Defence Procurement Directive 
should help. 
2  Malcolm Chalmers, “Prospects for UK Defence after the SDSR”, RUSI Future Defence Review Working Paper (2010) 
3  For example, in Bruno Tertrais, “L’apocalypse n’est pas pour demain”, (2011).
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4Predictions by participants on the prospects vary greatly. If a true joint ‘European prime 
contractor’ were to emerge, the wider economic benefits for the two nations could also be 
considerable, notably in fast-growing third markets such as Saudi Arabia and India, where 
Europeans competing against each other lowers the overall economic benefits that are 
possible. But any significant impact on what looks like a looming military funding crisis in 
Europe over the next decade seems unlikely.     
In the context of the Europeans in NATO being required by the Americans to do more for 
their own defence, the British and French determination to give priority to their strategic 
arsenals has a clear logic. Their unique contribution should increase the pressure on the 
purely conventionally-armed countries to, at the very least, maintain their capabilities. 
However, unsurprisingly perhaps, this is not happening. This year, only Denmark (to 1.4% 
of GDP), Slovenia (to 1.6%) and Turkey (to 2.4%) were increasing their military spending. 
Everywhere else, the rush to economize is accelerating. Germany’s recent decision to cut 
a series of programmes (including orders for the Typhoon of, incidentally, some macro-
economic significance, given the controversy over imbalances in the eurozone) came on top 
of the reductions of 20% over the next five years, to 1.4% of GDP (albeit with the end of 
conscription allowing, apparently, for a doubling of ‘deployable forces’) announced only 
last May. Italy is undertaking, or is committed to, cuts of 10%, to 1.5% of GDP (falling 
principally on the navy); Spain of 7%, to 1.1% of GDP (including the cancellation of a refit 
for one of its two carriers, the ‘Principe de Asturias’, which may render it nonoperational); 
the Netherlands of 8%, to 1.4% of GDP (including a significant reduction in the air force) 
and Poland of 9%, to 1.9% of GDP (again falling mostly on the air force). All this may 
be compared with what is happening in non-NATO EU members, such as Sweden, where 
spending has been frozen at just over 1% of GDP; or Austria, where there have been cuts 
of 20%, to 0.8% of GDP. 4
It is generally recognised that Washington perceives the Anglo-French Defence Treaty as a 
potential catalyst for creating the greater cooperation on conventional capabilities in Europe 
they consider indispensable to securing the force levels necessary for maintaining the 
Alliance in broadly its present form: ‘a new framework for an old objective’. It is hoped that, 
over time, other countries with a sufficient ‘mutual confidence’ and ‘clarity of common 
purpose’,5 will associate themselves to particular programmes or projects. Certainly, 
commentators in both Paris and Berlin envisage, for example, the Franco-German joint 
brigade (some 6000 mechanised infantry established in 1987) being perhaps linked in 
some way with the Franco-British expeditionary force proposed in the Treaty. The Dutch 
too, might become involved through the amphibious warfare capability they already share 
with the British. They also share a rapid deployment land headquarters with the Germans. 
Former NATO Secretary-General Solana recently suggested Spain might become interested 
4  See, inter alia, “The Military Balance 2011”, International Institute for Strategic Studies, (March 2011), and “European – United   
           States defence expenditure in 2009, European Defence Agency, (December 2010)
5  See, for example “Surviving Austerity: The case for a new approach to EU Military Collaboration”, by Tomas Valasek, Centre for  
           European Reform (August 2011).
SU_AngloFrench.indd   4 23/01/2012   12:32:26
5through the comparable capability it shares with France and Italy. Spain and Italy have 
a joint (but non-permanent) amphibious force. Finally, Minister Sikorsky has expressed 
Poland’s general interest in engaging with such evolving partnerships. 
Will the existence of a strong avant-garde force by Britain and France really encourage the 
convergence onto their pattern of, for instance, ‘risk-taking, loss-taking, expeditionary 
undertaking culture’ without which any integration of capabilities cannot be sustained? 
The Franco-German brigade could not be used in Afghanistan, despite its excellent quality 
of equipment and high morale, because the two governments could not agree on where it 
should be deployed and what should be its rules of engagement with the enemy. Nor could 
the Anglo-Dutch force of marines, for similar reasons, notwithstanding a shared training 
program in mountain warfare which is, perhaps, the best in the Alliance. More recently, 
there has been the German abstention at the United Nations over Libya. All of this has led 
many observers to conclude that the Anglo-French Defence Treaty will remain a more or less 
strictly bilateral affair for the foreseeable future. But then the issue of the growing pressure 
on conventional capability will remain unresolved. Some observers in Washington have 
professed surprise at how great Britain’s and France’s dependence on American assets in the 
Libya conflict proved to be. The Europeans’ weakness in drones, for example, was especially 
a cause for concern.    
However, the differences between the belligerence of the governments of Britain and France 
on the one hand, and of Germany and the Netherlands on the other, are more dramatic 
than between their respective electorates. For example, British and German popular support 
for engagement in the Afghan conflict, over the last five years, have been surprisingly 
similar. The divergence comes in the British government’s superior enthusiasm for being 
seen to support American policy and the British public’s superior tolerance of this, and of 
the losses it inevitably entails. Much the same can be said of opinion towards the desirability 
of the intervention in Libya, which was almost equally sceptical directly before the start of 
the conflict, as Gaddafi unleashed his killers upon Bengazi, and almost equally positive once 
its successful conclusion became clear, following the fall of Tripoli. The only significant shift 
came in British public attitudes towards France, following President Sarkozy’s and Prime 
Minister Cameron’s visit to the country when the perception that this was a victory shared 
with the French, without American leadership, was greeted with (somewhat surprised) 
enthusiasm. 
Naturally, neither London, nor Paris, view the desirability of other states becoming 
associated with their cooperation purely in military terms. President Sarkozy’s decision 
to bring France fully back into NATO has drawn the firmest line imaginable under the 
specific, protracted campaign, initiated by General de Gaulle, to create a separate, purely 
European defence identity, as part of an assertion of wider geopolitical independence. 
Nevertheless, the substantive issue at stake, now expressed principally through debates, 
often on French initiative, over the role, if any, of the EU institutions in establishing a strong 
SU_AngloFrench.indd   5 23/01/2012   12:32:27
6‘European pillar’ within the Alliance, and binding non-NATO EU states to a shared security 
and foreign policy agenda, has definitely not gone away. It may be about to be matched 
by a comparable, but probably incompatible, campaign by the British to use the Anglo-
French Defence Treaty as a template for a different type of Europe generally. One that 
builds on the progressive weakening of the European Commission, and a strengthening 
of the European Council, which has been such a signal feature of the current financial 
crisis, and endeavours to formalise an intergovernmental ‘Europe des Patries’. Whatever 
entertainment might be derived from the irony that the British are the Gaullists now should 
not disguise the seriousness of such an ambition for the Conservative side of the London 
coalition administration, especially were the measures to stabilize the eurozone to falter in 
the medium term.    
All this pales before the reality that the primary focus of implementing the Treaty will not 
be the preservation of defence capabilities in the face of cuts: in the jargon, ‘defence 
led’. British and French officials may talk in these terms, but it is apparent that the strong 
aspiration will be to achieve a specific quantum of savings: ‘money led’. The most recent 
proof of this in London has been the exceedingly dusty reception given to Professor Prins’ 
proposals that the next defence spending review should initially be made without the 
participation of the Treasury.6 But it has long been apparent in the staleness of discussions 
over possible conventional deployments, in Paris as well as London. Libya was an exception, 
justified by powerful economic and political, as well as humanitarian arguments. There is 
a general acceptance that future missions will, from now on, be increasingly tailored to 
the straightened means available. That might be discouraging for the Americans. But it is 
most encouraging for the prospects of the Treaty delivering real change. For if there is one 
constant in the conduct of defence policy, it is that, actual or imminent warfare apart, only 
financial restraint offers any chance of forcing radical enhancements in efficiency. 
This is definitely not to say that there is no new thinking going on about actual defence 
needs. Interestingly, just as they are confronting the greater relative weight in their budgets 
of the strategic nuclear component, Paris and London are also reflecting, for the first time in 
many years, on the precise purpose of these forces and the threats they might be seeking to 
deter. Spending worldwide on nuclear weapons is currently estimated to be at the highest 
level since the end of the Cold War. The increasing activity of China is especially striking 
(both on land, where they are engaged in a dramatic hardening of their bunkers and, 
potentially, at sea, where they seem likely to bring into service at least one, and possibly 
two, missile-carrying submarines over the next seven years). But the list of nations now in 
the category of pre-capable, for whom the acquisition of a few warheads and basic delivery 
systems could be very rapid, has never been longer. The growing pressures of population 
growth and climate change on scarce resources are also, clearly, increasing the variety 
and plausibility of scenarios in which they might be used. In particular, the possibility of a 
nuclear arms race in the Middle East, following on from Iran’s acquisition of such weapons, 
that might draw in both Pakistan and India is, obviously, increasingly exercising British and 
6  Gwyn Prins,“The British Way of Strategy-Making: Vital Lessons For Our Times,”, RUSI, (October 2011)
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7French strategists, just as much as their equivalents in Washington, Moscow, and Beijing. 
One common thread in all this is the fact that the number of weapons which might be able 
to hit targets in Europe, but not the United States, could grow dramatically.7 It would be 
unconscionable, therefore, not to at least make some effort towards a specifically European 
deterrent of some kind.  
President Sarkozy has already indicated, in general terms, that the ‘Force de Frappe’ is 
available to protect all member states of the European Union. He has further specified the 
possibility of a single warhead strike to prevent, or retaliate to, sub-strategic threats and it is 
assumed that some of the missiles in the French submarines are routinely configured in this 
way (without, apparently, altering the total number of warheads deployed). Britain has so 
far covered the case of using its deterrent within the overall obligation for mutual defence 
of NATO, though it, too, has raised the necessity of being able to deliver a sub-strategic 
response to a ‘rogue state’ deploying or employing chemical and biological agents as well 
as atomic weapons, to explain the retention of its ‘independent capability’. So speculation 
as to what the British would in fact do, in a scenario of asymmetry between European and 
American perceptions of any nuclear response requirement, is difficult to separate from the 
question of how ‘independent’ their capability truly is. Clearly, no such issue attaches to the 
French system. In terms of use, American capacity to curtail British intentions is confined 
to the accuracy of the targeting: important, particularly in some of the most common sub-
strategic use scenarios, but by no means critical. However, the credibility of any eventual 
declared doctrine by the British of using nuclear forces to defend specifically European 
interests, by implication, however remote the contingency, if necessary in opposition to the 
policy of the United States, would clearly be diminished by the fact that the current Trident 
missiles are drawn from a shared American maintenance pool. This has to be a factor in any 
British thinking about the replacement of the Trident system.
In the latest, and perforce the last, delay in a decision for this, in October last year, the 
British Government announced a series of life-extension measures, across all elements of 
the system, which allowed the ‘High Gate’ commitment to be postponed until 2016. This 
would put it immediately after the anticipated date of the next General Election under 
the legislation ensuring fixed term Parliaments in 2015, which raises the possibility of it 
thus becoming politicised. The estimated decommissioning dates for the Vanguard Class 
submarines are now, therefore: ‘HMS Vanguard’ 2028, ‘HMS Victorious’ 2030, ‘HMS 
Vigilant’ 2032, and ‘HMS Vengeance’ 2034. One important element in the life-extension 
of the warheads was the need for laser testing and computer modelling to ensure viability. 
An agreement allowing for this to be undertaken in cooperation with France, which has 
recently renewed its facilities as part of its M51 programme, was attached to the Anglo-
French Defence Treaty; significantly, also the first time that Britain has shared nuclear 
weapons secrets with any power other than the United States. Might this momentous 
step merely be the first of a series which could produce both very significant financial and 
political benefits for both nations? 
7  See, for example, Bruno Tertrais “Nuclear Weapons in Europe – A Long Dormant Debate Brewing Again”, The European,  
          (automne-hiver 2009); and, “The 10 Reasons we know that Iran Wants the Bomb”, Realité EU, (September 2011).
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8Britain’s progressive postponements of the initiation of its system’s renewal has led to a 
certain convergence of its timetable for its submarines with that of France. The latest 
estimates appear to be that ‘Le Triomphant’, the oldest French boat, which entered 
service in 1997, will (in the absence of costly life-extension measures) be decommissioned 
sometime around 2027, with ‘Le Temeraire’, ‘Le Vigilant’ and ‘Le Terrible’ following at 
roughly two year intervals. Paris took the initial decision to go ahead with building its 
present system in the autumn of 1981. Construction of ‘Le Triomphant’ began in 1986. 
On the face of it, therefore, there might be considerable scope for joint activity. There 
would undoubtedly be many difficulties, not least with regard to the United States goal 
of preserving their secrets, notably in the nuclear power plants, which they have made 
available to the British. But even making allowance for this, the potential economies from 
cooperation could be very great. The same might conceivably also be true for the warheads. 
The existing British devices will be viable and reliable until the mid 2020’s, but the Ministry 
of Defence has indicated that amongst the options it is considering is merely to continue 
with the existing design. The French have a new device, which will start to be fitted to the 
M51 vehicle from 2015. Finally, there are the missiles themselves. Here, the divergence 
of renewal schedules is, on the face of it, widest. It is also, perhaps, difficult to imagine a 
British decision to, say, jointly develop an alternative vehicle with the French, being a more 
cost-effective option than the existing proposed purchase of Trident successors from the 
Americans. On the other hand, unless Britain is prepared to do this, all talk of independence 
of its deterrence from the United States will be eyewash.     
The financial calculation on a new Anglo-French sea-launched missile also leaves out, 
of course, the broader economic benefits which might accrue for Britain from increased 
expenditure on the relevant research and manufacturing. It is extraordinarily difficult 
to quantify these, not least because those studies which have been conducted usually 
seek to justify actual, or projected, cost over-runs, or new categories of expenditure, in 
specific projects, rather than to encourage a coherent overall strategy. Greater integration 
specifically between Britain’s and France’s constructors supporting their deterrents might, 
in some respects, prove easier than between those supporting other systems. Conflicts 
of interest arising from competition for sales to, or joint ventures with, partners in third 
markets, especially outside Europe, would not apply. Some British commercial interests 
have suggested that any loosening of the Anglo-American strategic equipment relationship 
would jeopardise the continuation of the extensive sub-contracting agreements across a 
range of conventional equipment. But there is no reason to see why this should be the case 
if the overall policy of Washington remains, beyond next year’s presidential elections, as it 
seems to be now tolerant, not to say supportive, of any measures which reduce European 
dependence on American military might.8
8  Of course, there is also the highly sensitive matter of Anglo-American intelligence cooperation, which far exceeds anything  
           undertaken with any European ally, including France. An intelligence dimension to the Anglo-French Defence Treaty has been  
           mooted in a very round-about way, but, if this were to come about, it would mark a far greater breach with previous British  
           practise than anything currently contemplated in the field of nuclear weapons. Some observers have suggested that moves  
           towards shared research capabilities on major powers, such as China, India and Russia, that could form part of the new External  
           Action Service, might also be the embryo of some form of joint European intelligence effort, but all such ideas are, at the  
           moment, to put it mildly, very speculative indeed.
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9This is, of course, the crucial point, at least from a British perspective. The French, however, 
seem, on occasion, to show some reluctance in entering into arrangements which would 
be too tightly bilateral with Britain alone. They have a clearer hope than the British that, for 
example in the next generation of submarines and missiles, European defence cooperation 
would have advanced to a point where ‘other nations’, such as Germany could also become 
involved. That would obviously make a significant impact upon the potential savings to 
both Britain and France. From a British and French, but also a European point of view, the 
best outcome would be for both nations to maintain, or even increase their nuclear (and 
conventional) capabilities, but have Germany, say, contribute to the cost, in return for 
some co-decision over deployment and engagement. This could include, but would not be 
exclusively, the gifting some of the components of the boats or delivery vehicles, of clear 
economic benefit to its industries, and perhaps the provision of some of the crews, either at 
the bases (where they would still be targets of possible pre-emptive or disarming strikes by 
an opponent) or on active operational patrols. 
Such an approach would fit with the notion that European states should specialise on 
specific areas of capability, rather than have all the inefficiencies of seeking to reproduce, 
in miniature, all-round forces, which has long been canvassed in the conventional field. It 
is impossible to untangle judgements on the likelihood of this from the broader questions 
of the prospects for a more truly European nuclear deterrent force. No mainstream German 
commentators seem ready to explore these sorts of possibilities at the moment. But equally, 
none have ruled them out totally for the longer term. There is a tendency, understandable 
given the long planning, construction, and active life of the technologies involved, to see 
this aspect of the nuclear issue as equally slow and evolutionary. However, the accelerating 
pace of geopolitical change may give that the lie. For example, if the present euro crisis does 
lead to some major qualitative change in the degree of political integration amongst those 
states using the single currency, it would be surprising if this did not also have an impact 
upon foreign policy, security, and defence arrangements. 
Some experts believe it is in the area of operational integration that the key to unlocking 
this sort of wider progress might lie. The ‘main driver’ of the Britain’s renewal timetable 
for its Trident system has been the need to retain continuous at sea deterrence (CASD). 
London, like Paris, sees this as requiring four boats. If it could be countenanced that, to 
some degree, this capability were to be pooled, with, for instance, only one of the two 
nations on occasion having a submarine on patrol, whilst, perhaps, the other would hold a 
vessel capable, in extremis, of firing from the dockside. This might mean they would each 
have to build only three, or even two, new boats: not merely a very substantial saving, but 
the cornerstone of an unprecedented level of trust between two sovereign nations, with 
ramifications that would go far beyond the field of defence. Juristically, it would be on a 
par with the proposal of Anglo-French union advocated by Winston Churchill in 1940. At 
present, this seems not to be really on the agenda. Nevertheless, a clue as to its possible 
eventual acceptance may lie in the increasing evidence of a consensus between the British 
and the French on what they do not think worth exploring in the modernisation of their 
nuclear forces. 
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For example, there is a shared scepticism towards the savings available if each national force 
moved from a ‘Straight’ CASD to a CASD ‘Capable’ (that is to say, only being constantly 
at sea during periods of crisis) establishment. Again, both nations reject the sort of ‘dual 
capable’ force based upon fitting missile tubes to attack submarines (in the British case, 
to boats of the Astute Class) advocated by Professor Chalmers, not least because it would 
probably be more expensive than having specialised strategic vessels and the possible 
slight increase in survivability would not be worth it. Or again, neither country foresees any 
circumstances in which they would believe it correct to abandon sea-based deterrence in 
favour of land-based systems, even one that was actively deployed. (Most proponents of this 
option present it as a minimum, ‘non-deployed but survivable’ configuration). Finally, both 
nations share not just at a political, but also at a popular level, comparable majority support 
for remaining nuclear-armed powers: the ultimate sinews of this whole debate, even if such 
strong will is pressured, as never before, by limited finances. As Sherlock Holmes remarked 
in ‘The Mystery of the Bruce-Partington Plans’, a story about the theft of the design of a 
revolutionary submarine, ‘When all other contingencies fail, whatever remains, however 
improbable, must be the truth’. ■    










The signing of Anglo-French Defence Treaty has 
been one of the least reported, and analysed, of the 
UK coalitions Government’s policies, whilst being, 
without question, one of its most significant. In the 
context of defence cuts on both sides of the Atlantic 
and the Channel, and of a Libyan operation in which 
Britain and France’s dependence on American assets 
surprised some observers in Washington, this paper 
assesses the consequences of the Treaty for Anglo-
French defence cooperation.
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